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Abstract: This technical note aims to provide a practical overview of the labour market’s benchmark macroeconomic 
models. The matching models are the primary and most popular theoretical tools used by economists to evaluate various 
labour market policies and to study the problem of unemployment. These models explain the co-existence in equilibrium of 
unemployment and vacancies through frictions in matching workers and firms and generate predictions that have the right 
direction: unemployment goes up in recession and down in boom, while job vacancies shift in the opposite direction. The 
central role of these models in imperfect labour markets has recently been confirmed by the 2010 Nobel Prize for economy 
awarded to the founders of this approach: Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Nowadays, the matching models of equilibrium 
unemployment are the primary and most 
popular theoretical tools used by academic and 
government economists to evaluate various 
economic policies and to study the problem of 
unemployment (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 
2008). Indeed, they are the benchmark 
macroeconomic models of the labour market 
(Garibaldi, 2006). These models are in fact able 
to explain the co-existence in equilibrium of 
unemployment and vacancies through frictions 
in matching workers and firms. Furthermore, 
from an empirical point of view, these models 
appear to satisfactorily explain what occurs in 
reality: in fact, « […] in calibrations, matching 
models are usually compared with Hansen’s 
calibrated model (i.e. the benchmark real 
business cycle model) and are shown to 
perform at least as well » (Pissarides, 2000, p. 
36). The central role of these models in 
imperfect labour markets has recently been 
confirmed by the 2010 Nobel Prize for economy 
awarded to the founders of this approach: Peter 
Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Christopher 
Pissarides. 
The awareness of the fact that modern labour 
markets are characterised by large flows, both 
of workers in and out of employment and of job 
vacancies created and destroyed by firms, has 
led to this new theoretical approach whose main 
scope is to derive an empirically realistic 
equilibrium unemployment theory, in which 
unemployment persists in equilibrium. The flow 
of workers between employment, 
unemployment and inactivity, and the rich 
dynamics behind them, is a characteristic 
common to both the American (Blanchard and 
Diamond, 1990a) and European (Burda and 
Wyplosz, 1994) labour market. Although these 
flows are in theory compatible with labour 
turnover over a fixed number of jobs, the 
reallocation of workers is actually associated 
with substantial annual flows in job creation and 
destruction at the single firm level (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992). Even in the absence of net 
changes in employment, the simultaneous 
creation and destruction of jobs is intense 
(Bagliano and Bertola, 1999; Andolfatto, 
2008).
1
 
The acknowledged importance of these flows in 
the persistence of unemployment, even at 
equilibrium, substantiates the economic 
mechanism underlying matching models: the 
                                                 
1 For example, in Canada during the period 1976 – 1991 a 
small net change in employment, amounting to 15.000 
individuals, was consistent with approximately one 
million individuals transiting in and out of employment 
(see Jones, 1993). 
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matching process between workers and firms. 
More precisely, employment dynamics are the 
result of vacancies being created and filled by 
firms, and the activity of job-seekers, 
particularly the unemployed.
2
 The matching 
between a firm and worker results in a filled, 
and thus active, job that therefore produces 
income and is able to pay wages (Bagliano and 
Bertola, 1999). However, matching takes time 
to finalise since the process is characterised by a 
decentralised, uncoordinated and costly (in 
terms of both time and money) search 
conducted by job-seekers and firms (Bagliano 
and Bertola, 1999).
3
 Worker-firm matching is 
not instantaneous due to the existence of 
frictions (i.e. search externalities, heterogeneity 
of individuals and jobs, incomplete information 
etc.). Search externalities, also known as 
congestion externalities, are particularly 
relevant in matching models (see Pissarides, 
2000). In fact, every firm that creates new jobs 
produces externalities that are positive for job-
seekers (since the probability of finding a job 
increases) and negative for other firms (since 
the probability of filling existing vacancies is 
reduced); vice versa, an increase in job-seekers 
produces positive externalities for firms and 
negative externalities for other job-seekers, for 
precisely the opposite reasons.
4
 
It should be specified that the idea that labour 
market frictions exist and are significant is not 
unique to matching models and was already 
present in Hutt (1939) and Hicks (1963). The 
latter, in particular, claimed that the short-term 
disequilibrium in the labour market was due to 
the fact that wages were slow to adjust in the 
wake of economic shocks, and that this was 
                                                 
2  Furthermore, in these models the definition of 
unemployment is consistent with that typically used in 
national job-force surveys: individuals are considered 
unemployed when they do not have a job but are actively 
searching for one (Andolfatto, 2008).  
3  This differs from the traditional neoclassic model in 
which the matching process is centralised and 
coordinated, and work demand and offer are instantly 
balanced by variations in wages. 
4  In the matching framework, firms and workers have 
completely rational expectations, i.e. they are fully aware 
of the matching process. Nonetheless, they act 
independently, without attempting to coordinate their 
actions (Pissarides, 2000). 
attributable to existing frictions. This view has 
essentially been confirmed by more recent 
studies (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). 
Keynes (1936), on the other hand, basically 
coined the term “frictional unemployment”, and 
believed that this type of unemployment was 
not particularly significant and as a 
consequence disagreed that frictions played a 
major role in the slow adjustment of wages. 
The work carried out in the ‘60s and ‘70s (e.g. 
Alchian, 1969; Phelps, 1968, 1970, 1972; 
Mortensen, 1970) successively emphasised the 
key role played by search frictions and led to 
today’s search theory, i.e. an unemployment 
theory based on the assumption that labour-
market search is an economically costly 
activity. Basically, in models where the 
individual must choose how to optimally divide 
his time between work and leisure, a third 
option is introduced: the option of searching for 
a new and/or better job. The search equilibrium 
has two key properties: 1) search frictions that 
introduce monopoly revenue, subdivided 
between firm and worker through wage 
determination once a match has been made; 2) 
indifference to the so called congestion 
externalities in individual optimisation 
problems. In short, individuals ignore the 
effects their actions have on the aggregate 
probability of finding a job and filling a 
vacancy. 
Starting from the late ‘70s – early ‘80s, more 
analytically sophisticated models were 
constructed, now commonly known as search 
and matching models. Amongst these, a 
distinction can be made between those that 
focus on the entire economy, in particular on the 
presence of multiple equilibria (Diamond, 
1982a, 1982b, 1984), and those whose main 
focus is on the labour market (Pissarides, 1979, 
1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 2000; Mortensen, 
1987; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 1998 
and 1999; and Pissarides, 2000). The first 
models in which the matching function is not 
only present but is also the main economic 
mechanism underlying unemployment, 
basically replacing the reservation wage,
 5
 are 
                                                 
5  The reservation wage is the wage that leaves an 
individual indifferent to working or not. It is deduced by 
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those of Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), 
Diamond and Maskin (1979), Bowden (1980). 
The matching function is conceptually 
equivalent to the production function: the result 
of the “productive process” is the creation of 
jobs and the “productive factors” are job-
seekers (unemployed worker)
6
 and vacancies 
(Bagliano and Bertola, 1999). As a 
consequence, the use of an aggregate 
(macroeconomic) function is justified by its 
empirical relevance and ability to capture the 
main characteristics of the matching process 
(Pissarides, 2000). In this sense, the matching 
function is a useful modelling tool, as it can 
describe the job formation process without 
having to clarify the reasons that make this 
process challenging and costly. Moreover, the 
matching function is able to grasp (as will 
become apparent in the next paragraph) 
variations in both the optimal behaviour of 
firms and workers and the degree of mismatch 
present in the labour market.
7
 
From an empirical point of view, it is common 
in the literature to resort to the constant returns 
to scale hypothesis and utilise a Cobb-Douglas 
type function to describe the matching process. 
Both of these assumptions are empirically 
supported (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, 
1990b; Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001; Stevens, 2007). However, 
although the choice of a Cobb-Douglas type 
function is common in the literature, its 
application lacks a convincing theoretical 
explanation. It is, in fact, employed mainly due 
to empirical evidence and not because of 
consensus at the theoretical (microeconomic) 
                                                                               
equalling the benefit of being employed and the 
opportunity cost of being employed. Economies with a 
lower reservation wage have a higher level of 
employment; however this does not necessarily imply a 
greater social wellbeing. There is, in fact, no a priori 
reason for believing that higher levels of employment 
necessarily correspond to higher levels of social 
wellbeing (Andolfatto, p. 84, 2008). 
6  In the case where on-the-job search (employed 
individuals searching for a job) is not possible, the only 
job-seekers are the unemployed. 
7  The degree of mismatch is an empirical concept. Its 
increase (decrease) indicates that the matching process, 
under the same conditions of vacancies and 
unemployment, has become more difficult (easier). 
level. Despite its importance, in fact, few 
attempts have been made at microfounding the 
matching function and, above all, no 
microfoundation is better than another 
(Pissarides, 2000). The aggregate-type matching 
function is, in fact, usually described as a 
“black-box” (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001).
8
 
 
2 The basic matching framework 
 
This paragraph will introduce the baseline 
matching model commonly used in theoretical 
analyses.  It is common practice to consider a 
match between job and worker as a firm, in 
other words to assume that each firm only 
employs one worker (one-job-firm assumption). 
The following approach essentially focuses on 
analysing the match rather than the firm.
9
 
As previously mentioned, the main element 
underlying these models is the matching 
function, which expresses the number of jobs 
created in any given moment in time 
( LmM  ) as a function of the total number of 
unemployed workers ( LuU  ) and of 
vacancies ( LvV  ): 
 
   LvLumLmVUmM  ,,   [1] 
 
where m , u  and v  are, respectively, the rate of 
matching, unemployment and vacancy, whereas 
L  is the labour force (generally normalised to 1 
and assumed to be constant in time). The 
                                                 
8 An alternative to the Cobb-Douglas matching function, 
which has received important and recent consensus, is the 
stock-flow matching model (Coles and Smith, 1998; 
Coles and Muthoo, 1998; Lagos, 2000; Gregg and 
Petrongolo, 2005; Shimer, 2007; Ebrahimy and Shimer, 
2010). The idea behind this approach is the following: 
when a job-seeker enters the market searching for a job, 
s/he considers all the available vacancies and applies for 
the job position s/he deems most adequate. If the response 
is positive, i.e. s/he is hired, s/he becomes employed and 
stops searching, whereas in the case of a negative 
response s/he remains in the market awaiting new 
vacancies, having already discarded the old ones. As a 
consequence, job-seekers are initially flows and vacancies 
are stock, while successively job-seekers are stock and 
vacancies are flows. 
9 Matching models that disregard the commonly accepted 
one-job-firm hypothesis are those of Bertola and 
Caballerro (1994) and Garibaldi (2006). 
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matching function basically describes the 
efficiency of the matching process, highlighting 
the importance of the two inputs (vacancies and 
unemployed workers) in the creation of jobs 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Assuming, as 
is common in the literature, that the matching 
function is increasing and concave in both 
arguments and degree 1 homogeneous, i.e. 
characterised by constant returns to scale, 
equation [1] can be simplified and rewritten as:  
  
   vummvumLLm ,,    [2] 
 
Resorting to the commonly used Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, the matching function 
becomes:10 
 
  1vum      [3] 
 
where 10   is the (constant) elasticity of the 
matching function with respect to the 
unemployment rate, namely 


 







1
11
 ,
vu
u
vu
m
u
u
m
um . 
Furthermore, the constant returns to scale 
hypothesis allows attention to be focalised on a 
single variable, known as “market tightness”  , 
which expresses the relationship between 
vacancies and unemployment, i.e. uv / . The 
matching function can be used to calculate both 
the rate with which an unemployed worker finds 
a job: 
 
                                                 
10 In order to simplify the explanations and for greater 
clarity, the Cobb-Douglas functional form will be used 
throughout this work. In empirical calibrations, it is 
common practice to introduce a multiplicative factor to 
the matching function, i.e. m = μ uα v(1 – α), in order to 
account for the degree of mismatch which, under the 
same conditions of vacancies and unemployment, makes 
the matching process more or less difficult. It follows that 
the larger μ is, the more efficient the matching process 
and therefore the smaller the degree of mismatch. 
Moreover, as the search intensity and the posting of 
vacancies may be seen as parameters of technological 
change in the matching function (see Pissarides, p. 124, 
2000), an increase in the search intensity of workers 
and/or a higher publicising of vacancies by firms makes 
more efficient the matching process. For a broader 
discussion on this subject see Pissarides (2000, chapter 
5). 


 









 1
11
u
v
u
vu
u
m
  
[4] 
and the rate with which a vacant position is 
filled: 
 


 










u
v
v
vu
v
m 1
        
[5] 
 
 1  and    are the two rates that characterise 
the matching process and express, respectively, 
the instantaneous probability of finding a job 
and of filling a vacancy. It immediately follows 
that the instantaneous probability of finding a 
job is positive-concave with regards to the 
vacancies-unemployment ratio, whereas the 
probability of filling a vacancy is negative-
convex. Furthermore, these instantaneous 
probabilities can (theoretically) tend to infinity 
in an infinitesimal time interval, dt. In 
particular: 
 
0limlim 10 







  ;
 





  0
1 limlim . 
 
It must be pointed out that these properties hold 
true independently of whether a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form is used. 
Employment (n), evolves over time in 
accordance to inflows (filled vacancies, 
unemployed workers finding a job) and 
outflows (existing jobs destroyed with 
exogenous rate  ). Consequently, the change in 
employment over time can be expressed as both 
a function of the firm’s transition rate (   ): 
    nv
dt
dn
n ; and as a function of the 
worker’s transition rate (  1 ): 
    nu
dt
dn
n 1 . As a result, it must be 
true that: 
 
u
v
nunv a    1  [6] 
 
The relationship between the vacancy rate and 
the unemployment rate represents a measure of 
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labour market tightness, and as already seen, the 
probability of finding a job and of filling a 
vacancy depends on this. The chosen reference 
point is of utmost importance in understanding 
how this variable describes labour market 
frictions: indeed, for the firm, an increase in   
makes filling a vacancy more difficult due to 
the so called congestion externalities; vice versa 
the situation is improved for the worker since it 
becomes easier to find a job (the so called 
positive externalities derived from a “denser” 
market). In matching models it is common 
practice to take the firm’s point of view as 
reference, in other words an increase in labour 
market tensions (or tightness) is associated with 
an increase in  . 
Another fundamental labour market analysis 
tool, often associated with the matching 
function, is the Beveridge Curve, i.e. the inverse 
relationship between unemployment and 
vacancy rate.
11
 This relationship can be easily 
obtained from the following expression, which 
describes how the unemployment rate changes 
over time: 
 
    11 uuu    [7] 
 
where   u1  represents unemployment 
inflows, i.e. existing jobs destroyed at rate  , 
un1  is in fact the normalised labour force, 
whereas 
  1u describes the unemployment 
outflows, i.e. unemployed workers that find a 
job. In steady state equilibrium, where 
unemployment is constant over time, i.e. 0u , 
it follows that: 
 




1
u      [8] 
 
this equation expresses the reverse relationship 
between unemployment and the measure of 
labour market frictions and, therefore, between 
u  and v  (since 0/  v ). 
                                                 
11  This relationship is empirically proven and fully 
intuitive, since an increase in vacancies corresponds to a 
decrease in unemployment, and vice versa. The Beveridge 
Curve was discovered by, and is named after, the British 
social economist William Beveridge (1944). 
In order to calculate the equilibrium value of  , 
it is necessary to introduce the so called 
Bellman equations, named after the 
mathematician Richard Bellman who originally 
presented them in the ‘50s. The Bellman 
equations describe the expected marginal values 
(from which the interest rate r has been 
deducted) associated with the differing 
conditions of labour market participants, 
basically comparing them to financial securities. 
Formally, and very generally, the Bellman 
equations associated with the employment value 
(W), with the unemployment value (U), with the 
vacancy value (V) and the filled job value (J), 
are the following:
12
 
 
  WWUwWr      [9] 
  UUWbUr   1   [10] 
  VVJcVr      [11] 
  JJVwyJr      [12] 
 
the terms on the right hand side of the 
expressions are, respectively, the “dividends” 
associated with the different conditions (w = 
wage rate, b = employment opportunity cost, c 
= cost of opening a vacancy and y = 
productivity) and the “capital gains or losses”, 
in other words the transition from one condition 
to the other, influenced by the probability of 
finding a job, of filling a vacancy and by the job 
destruction rate.
13
 Finally, dtdXX /  (where 
JVUWX ,, , ) indicates the change over time 
of the presently considered deducted value. The 
equilibrium usually characterised by these 
models is the “ideal” stationary state, in which 
the values of the variables are not subject to 
further changes over time. It therefore follows 
that 0X X . The condition which allows the 
equilibrium value   to be determined is known 
                                                 
12 It is common practice in the literature to make use of 
linear utility functions. Assuming that individuals are risk 
neutral not only simplifies the analysis, but also allows to 
focus on the consequences of the search and matching 
process rather than on the deficiencies of the insurance 
markets. 
13 Intuitively, the transition from unemployed (vacancy) 
to employed (filled vacancy) is profitable for the worker 
(firm). In fact, necessary conditions for non trivial 
equilibria are W  U and J  V. 
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as the zero-profit or free-entry condition: a firm 
will continue to open new vacancies until the 
value of a further vacancy becomes equal to 
zero. In equilibrium, in fact, all the profit 
opportunities derived from opening new 
vacancies have been exploited, therefore the 
value of an additional vacancy is equal to 
zero.
14
 Setting 0V  in the Bellman equations 
[11] and [12], the following is obtained: 
 
 
 








 1








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










rc
wy
r
wy
c
J
c
wyJr
 [13] 
 
The former expression, which shows an inverse 
relationship between   and w , is known as the 
Job Creation Condition (JCC).
15
 Essentially, 
the net gain deducted by the firm must cover the 
expected costs associated with opening a 
vacancy. The reciprocal probability of filling a 
vacancy 
  /1  is, in fact, the average 
length of time for which a vacancy is filled.
16
 
With regards to w , wages can be determined in 
several ways,
17
 however it is common practice 
in the literature to use the generalised Nash 
bargaining rule.
18
 Based on this rule, the wage 
is determined by dividing, between firm and 
worker, the surplus generated by their matching. 
The optimisation problem which must be 
resolved is the following: 
 
                                                 
14  To be more precise, “at any given instant, in both 
stationary equilibrium and adjustment, firms take 
advantage of all profit opportunities that arise due to the 
opening of a vacancy:   ttV    0, . Therefore, even out 
of stationary equilibrium,   ttV    0, ” (Bagliano and 
Bertola, p.274, 1999). The application of the zero-profit 
condition, which ensures a closed-form solution of the 
model, was discussed for the first time by Pissarides 
(1979). 
15 The Job Creation Condition can be seen as a “special” 
job demand curve. Indeed, if the cost of opening a 
vacancy were zero, it would become a standard work 
demand, i.e. y = w. 
16 Similarly, the reciprocal probability of finding a job is 
the average duration of unemployment.  
17 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for an overview. 
18 The Nash rule is appropriate in this context, since it is 
assumed that both sides of the labour market implement 
costly search activities and that, therefore, a successful 
match is in their best interest. 
    UWVJw  1maxarg
  
where  1 0,  is a measure of the workers’ 
bargaining power, namely the surplus quota 
owed to the job factor. The relative first-order 
condition for optimal surplus subdivision is 
given by:  
 
   VJUW 




1
 
 
from which the following final expression is 
obtained (see Appendix A for the mathematical 
details), the so called Wage Setting (WS): 
 
    cybw 1   [14] 
 
with 0/  w , since an increase in   
increases the probability that an unemployed 
worker finds a job, thereby improving his/her 
external opportunities and hence bargaining 
power. 
We now have the three key equations 
(Beveridge Curve, Job Creation Condition and 
Wage Setting) – plus the definition of market 
tightness, i.e. uv /  – for representing the 
stationary state equilibrium reached in a labour 
market with frictions, characterised by four 
endogenous variables ( , w , u  and v ). The 
equilibrium value of   andw  is determined by 
the Job Creation Condition (equation 13) and 
the Wage Setting (equation 14). The Wage 
Setting is increasing in market tightness, 
whereas the Job Creation Condition can be re-
write as     rcyw , thus obtaining a 
negative relationship between wage and market 
tightness. Therefore, sufficient condition for the 
existence of an interior equilibrium is that 
     rcyw lim 0
    cybw 1lim 0 , namely 
by  , which is a necessary condition for a non 
trivial equilibrium. Finally, the equilibrium 
value of   allows the equilibrium values of u  
and v  to be determined (by using the Beveridge 
Curve and the definition of market tightness). 
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3 Endogenous job destruction rate 
 
It is often not completely realistic to assume 
that the job destruction rate   is exogenous. In 
some cases, in fact, the job destruction rate is 
more sensitive to economic shocks than the job 
creation rate (Pissarides, 2000).
19
 
When a shock affects job productivity, the firm 
can decide whether to continue using the labour 
factor at the new productivity or whether to 
destroy it.
20
 The choice is made by the firm in 
accordance with the so called “reserve 
productivity”, R : if the shock that affects the 
labour factor reduces productivity below this 
threshold, the firm will destroy the job, vice 
versa it will keep it open. In order to derive the 
reserve productivity, the overall productivity of 
the labour factor is now indicated by xy  , 
where y  is a general productivity parameter, 
whereas x  is the idiosyncratic (or specific) 
component that describes the change in 
productivity following the shock. Moreover, it 
is hypothesised that x  is drawn from a known 
continuous distribution function  xG  and that 
its value is between 0 and 1.
21
 As a 
consequence,  xJ  now represents the value of 
a filled vacancy with idiosyncratic productivity 
x , with R  satisfying the condition   0RJ . 
Following a shock, the firm’s best choice is to 
continue producing if and only if    RJxJ  . 
In this case, the Beveridge Curve of the model 
will have to account for the fact that not all 
negative shocks destroy jobs: 
 
 
  




1RG
RG
u     [15] 
 
                                                 
19 It must be pointed out that this is, however, mainly 
empirical evidence relative to the US and not European 
economy (Boeri, 1996). It is probable that this depends on 
the restrictions present in the European context that make 
job closing difficult (Garibaldi, 1998). 
20 In the presence of exogenous job destruction, instead, 
the immediate destruction of the job was hypothesised 
following a negative shock. 
21  This hypothesis can be generalised by indicating a 
positive value xmax  as the maximum value of idiosyncratic 
(or specific) component x. 
where    
1 
 
  1
R
xdGxRG  is the probability 
that a shock lowers productivity below R , thus 
destroying the job. Moreover, the threshold 
value of R  must also satisfy the condition 
UW  . The rule for determining wages (i.e. the 
subdivision of surplus) basically excludes 
voluntary unilateral separations, therefore, in 
order for the job to be destroyed, it is necessary 
that firms prefer to do without the labour, i.e. 
   RJxJ  , but also that workers prefer to be 
unemployed, i.e. UW  . 
The value of a filled vacancy, with idiosyncratic 
productivity x , and of a vacancy are essentially 
similar to those described previously (it is 
assumed that all newly created jobs are 
characterised by maximum productivity, namely 
x = 1): 
         sdGsJxJxwxyxJr
R

1
  [16] 
  VJcVr   1    [17] 
 
when the negative shock hits at the rate  , the 
firm must discard the value  xJ  for another 
value,  sJ , as long as    RJsJ  . Equations 
[16] and [17] allow the “new” Job Creation 
Condition and the Job Destruction Curve (JD) 
to be obtained (see Appendix B for the 
mathematical details): 
 
 
 
 R
r
y
cJCC 


 1
1


  , 
with 0
dR
d
; 
   
   sdGRs
ry
c
y
b
RJD
R
 




1
 
1
0




, with 0
dR
d
. 
 
Therefore, sufficient condition for the existence 
of an interior equilibrium is that 
 
 
 
  11
1
lim 0 









 RR
r
y
c


   is 
higher than 
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   
   











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c
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1
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


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1


  sdGRsry
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R
R


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These results are completely intuitive: the 
“new” Job Creation Condition has a negative 
slope even in the  R ,  interval since if 
R increases, the average duration of a job is 
reduced, and it is for this reason that the firm 
opens fewer vacancies, thereby decreasing  . 
By inverse reasoning, the Job Destruction 
Curve increases in R  and therefore has a 
positive slope in the  R ,  interval. 
 
4 Out-of-steady-state dynamics 
 
This paragraph focuses on the behaviour of 
unemployment rate and market tightness out-of-
steady-state, namely during the adjustment 
period that leads to equilibrium. 
One of the two main differential equations 
needed to study the dynamic of the model was 
introduced in the previous paragraph, i.e. 
           11 ttututu . From the 
dynamic equation for the unemployment rate, it 
immediately follows that the “reaction” (i.e. the 
variation over time) of u  with respect to u is 
negative: an increase in u, in fact, reduces the 
inflows and increases the outflows. This implies 
that for the points to the left and right of the 
curve 0u , the value of u tends to get 
increasingly closer to its steady state 
equilibrium value, i.e. for any initial value of 
0u , unemployment always converges to its 
equilibrium value (stable locus – see Figure 1). 
Due to the properties of the function
 1 , the 
relationship of u  with respect to   is also 
negative. Intuitively, if the probability of 
finding a job increases, the unemployment rate 
decreases. 
 
 
Figure 1. Out-of-steady-state dynamics of unemployment and market tightness 
 
On the other hand, it can be formally proven (cf. 
Appendix C for the mathematical details) that 
the variation of   over time does not depend (in 
an independent manner) on the rate of 
unemployment, but only on the level of   and 
on the model’s parameters. The variations in u 
are mediated by the matching process: in fact, 
as v (and therefore θ) varies, unemployment 
also varies due the change in the probability of 
finding a job. 
Furthermore, it is possible to show that 
 
 
0


t
t


 (see again Appendix C). This implies 
that for the points lying above and below the 
curve 0 , the value of   tends to shift 
increasingly further from its steady state value 
(unstable locus – cf. Figure 1). 
The apparently unstable behaviour of   is due 
to the fact that firms base their decision to 
create vacancies on the future expected value of 
 , and immediately create more vacancies if 
they foresee a future increase in vacant jobs in 
order to avoid creating new ones when their 
opening cost will be higher. In fact, the higher 
 , the lower the probability of filling a 
vacancy, whereas the average duration of a 
filled vacancy increases. This “forward 
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looking” attitude of firms, with regards to 
vacancies, makes v  and   “jump” variables, 
i.e. variables which respond immediately to 
changes in parameters or expectations. For this 
reason, labour market tightness immediately 
becomes long term and remains present 
throughout the entire adjustment period. The 
presence of a “backward looking” variable, i.e. 
a predetermined variable (the unemployment 
rate), and of a “forward looking” variable (the 
vacancy rate), implies a very simple adjustment 
dynamic that in turn implies the existence of a 
unique dynamic path (saddlepath) converging at 
steady state (saddlepoint), shown by point E in 
Figure 2.   
 
u
0u

0
saddlepath
E
 
Figure 2. Adjustment paths in labour-market tightness 
and unemployment space 
 
It is possible to formally verify the nature of an 
equilibrium saddlepoint by linearising the 
dynamic equations surrounding a generic steady 
state equilibrium point    ,u : 




























uuu
0

 
The negative sign of the determinant of the 
coefficient matrix confirms the nature of the 
steady state equilibrium saddlepoint.
 22 
 
                                                 
22 In order to have equilibrium stability, the matrix trace 
must be negative. In fact, “The equilibrium is a node that 
can be stable or unstable depending on whether the 
matrix trace is, respectively, smaller than or larger than 
zero” (cf. Bagliano and Bertola, p.259, 1999). 
5 The problem of social efficiency in the 
decentralised equilibrium 
 
The existence of externalities, and the fact that 
they are not taken into account by individual 
optimisation problems, immediately questions 
the social efficiency of the decentralised 
equilibrium.  As shown in Pissarides (chapter 8, 
2000) and Bagliano-Bertola (paragraph 5.4, 
1999), the decentralised market equilibrium 
achieved in the matching models coincides with 
the socially efficient equilibrium solution (in 
other words, it is efficient) when the surplus 
quota owed to the labour factor (  ) is equal to 
the elasticity (with respect to  ) of the average 
duration of a vacancy (  ). 23  Formally, the 
condition    can be derived by comparing 
the decentralised solution, put in place by a 
representative firm, and the socially efficient 
solution, put in place by a social planner. The 
solutions of the respective optimisation 
problems are the following (cf. Appendix D for 
the mathematical details): 
 Decentralised solution: 
 


 c
r
wy
; 
 Socially efficient solution: 
       



11
c
r
by
. 
By comparing the two optimality conditions it is 
deduced that: 
a) The “social” discount rate is larger than the 
“individual” rate        rr 1 . In 
fact, in the socially efficient solution, 
congestion externalities created by an increase 
in vacancies, and therefore  , are taken into 
account by a social planner. Therefore, in the 
socially efficient solution, the marginal value of 
a filled vacancy is discounted at a higher rate. 
                                                 
23 The average duration of a vacancy is the reciprocal of 
the probability of filling a vacancy, i.e. θ a. The 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale implies that the 
elasticity with respect to θ of the average duration of a 
vacancy is equal to the elasticity of the matching function 
with respect to the unemployment rate. According to 
Cobb-Douglas, this elasticity is equal to α. 
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b) The decentralised solution attributes a 
lower net productivity to a filled job than the 
socially efficient solution, since bw .24 
c) The expected cost of a filled vacancy 
evaluated by the socially efficient solution is 
larger than the estimated provided by the 
decentralised solution, namely 
 








c
c
1
, 
since   11 . This means that, with respect 
to the decentralised solution, the social planner 
will open a smaller number of vacancies so as 
not to further increase the average duration, and 
therefore the expected cost of a vacancy. 
Basically, the two solutions differ due to 
interest in congestion externalities in the 
centralised solution and the presence of wages 
in the decentralised solution. For this reason, the 
decentralised equilibrium will most probably be 
inefficient, since the rule for determining wages 
by subdividing the surplus between matched 
workers and firms neglects those (vacancies and 
unemployed) that are still engaged in search 
activities. The decentralised market equilibrium 
coincides with the socially efficient solution 
and, consequently, the wage determined by the 
Nash rule “internalises” the research 
externalities, when the following is true (in 
equilibrium 0V ):  
 
 
UWJ
c

 1
   [18] 
 
the efficiency condition requires that the 
expected cost of a filled vacancy, evaluated by 
the socially efficient solution, be equal to the 
surplus created by a match. Combining the 
former expression with the optimisation 
condition  JUW 




1
, it follows that:    
 
                                                 
24 The socially efficient solution disregards wages (since 
it simply constitutes a transfer of income between firms 
and workers) and considers the utility flows due to 
unemployed workers. 
 
J
c



    1
1
1
    





cc
1
1
1
   
where 
 

c
J  is the expected cost of a filled 
vacancy obtained from the optimisation 
condition in the decentralised equilibrium. The 
efficiency condition is therefore:
25
  
 
  11    [19] 
 
It should be stressed that social efficiency is 
most influenced by the allocation of resources, 
and whether or not an efficient decentralised 
equilibrium is reached. Unemployment is, in 
fact, probably the most significant result of the 
chosen mechanism for resource allocation, but it 
is not the cause of a non efficient allocation. 
When    the allocation of resources is not 
efficient since:  
 if   , firms create fewer jobs and 
workers search with less intensity since the 
reserve wage is excessively high (result: 
high unemployment); 
 if   , the reserve wage is too low and, as 
a consequence, workers accept a job too 
easily (result: underemployment). 
Therefore, very generally, equilibrium 
unemployment is greater than the socially 
efficient rate if   , whereas the reverse is 
true for   .26 
 
6 The main extension of the basic matching 
framework: the model with career choice 
 
Since the deliberate focus of these models is on 
the labour market, the matching literature 
wouldn’t be complete without the formalisation 
of an individual’s fundamental economic 
choice: the decision between entering the 
market as an entrepreneur or as a worker. 
                                                 
25  It must be pointed out that this is the efficiency 
condition only when the matching function displays 
constant returns to scale. 
26 For a broader discussion on this subject see Pissarides 
(2000). 
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However, the formalisation of this choice within 
a matching framework, is relatively recent (cf. 
Fonseca et al., 2001; Pissarides, 2002; Uren, 
2007). 
In matching models, the economic decision of 
an individual to become entrepreneur or worker 
is based on the comparison of the two values 
expected from labour market entry, i.e. the 
unemployment value and the vacancy value. 
Indeed, in Uren (2007), the equality condition 
    rUrV   allows the equilibrium value of 
labour market tensions to be determined, using 
the already discussed Bellman equations (see 
Appendix E):
27
 
        021221     rczyczy
      [20] 
The existence and the uniqueness of the value 
of   that satisfy this former expression is 
guaranteed by the condition 02  zy  (see 
again Appendix E). This condition arises since a 
job match generates y units of output but 
requires the input of a worker and an 
entrepreneur. Each individual may receive a 
flow utility of z when unemployed. Hence, for 
gain from production to exist, 02  zy  is 
necessary. 
Unlike the standard case of the basic model, the 
free-entry condition ( 0V ) is no longer used 
to determine the equilibrium value of  . 
Intuitively, in a model in which there is a fixed 
total number of firms, there is no need to apply 
the zero-profit condition when creating 
vacancies. In brief, if the number of firms is 
constant, the unrealistic possibility of infinite 
vacancy openings can never be true due to the 
fact that each firm only has one job/worker 
(one-job firm) Indeed, in the models that offer a 
career choice, the total population (not the 
labour force) is normalised to one, i.e. 
                                                 
27 Uren (2007) uses the z notation to identify the free-time 
value that essentially replaces the utility flow due to 
unemployed workers, i.e. the unemployment benefit b. 
An entrepreneur that places a vacancy deducts the cost of 
opening a vacancy from the free-time value. Therefore, in 
the surplus calculation shown in Appendix A, the dividend 
associated to the vacancy value in Uren (2007) is z – c. 
As for the rest, the Bellman equations are analogous to 
those already seen. 
  unvnll  11 , where 
  vnl 1  and unl   represent, 
respectively, the overall quota of entrepreneurs 
and of workers in the total population. The 
number of entrepreneurs ( l1 ) and of workers 
( l ) is obtained from the equations describing 
how vacancies and unemployment evolve over 
time: 
   vvlv   1    [21] 
  uulu   1    [22] 
where   vl 1 , the difference between the total 
number of firms and of vacancies, are the filled 
jobs, whereas  ul  represents employed 
workers, i.e. the difference between the labour 
force and unemployed workers. It is interesting 
to note that, unlike the basic model analysed 
previously (in which, given u  and  , the 
equilibrium level of vacancies is determined by 
the relationship uv ), this model also uses a 
dynamic equation for the vacancies. This is due 
to the fact that the new expression also makes 
explicit reference to the quota of 
entrepreneurs/firms in the total population. 
Finally, by applying the definition of labour 
market tensions, the values of u and v, obtained 
through use of the steady state 
condition 0uv  , are used to find the 
equilibrium value of l , which completes the 
model (see Appendix E for the mathematical 
details): 
u
v

  








1
1
21
l   [23] 
From an economic point of view, a clearer 
distinction between entrepreneurs and workers 
can be found in Fonseca et al. (2001). The 
authors, in fact, introduce the entrepreneurial 
ability,  , which follows a known distribution 
function,  F , in the population. This ability 
is comprised between a positive minimum 
value, 0min  , and a finite maximum value, 
max . The model’s solution is similar to that 
proposed by Uren, since the threshold value of 
entrepreneurial ability ( S ) is obtained from the 
following inequality: 
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    rUKrV     [24] 
where K is a fixed cost (start-up cost). Since 
 V  and  U are both assumed to be 
independent of   (entrepreneurial ability is, in 
fact, a simple multiplicative parameter), the 
inequality satisfies the so called “reservation of 
entrepreneurial ability property”: i.e. a 
reservation entrepreneurial ability, S , exists, 
such that an individual becomes entrepreneur if 
S ; vice versa, for S , s/he enters the 
market as a worker. Consequently, 
   
max 
 
  1


S
dFnuSF  is the quota of 
individuals that become workers, while 
   
max 
 
  1


S
dFnvSF  is the quota of 
entrepreneurs. Formally, the threshold value is 
given by: 
 
 

rV
KrU
S

     [25] 
with   0' S , since   0' V  and   0' U .28 
These properties can be very simply illustrated 
through the use of the Bellman equations 
introduced earlier (see Appendix F for the 
mathematical details). Intuitively, instead, the 
Job Creation Condition is decreasing in S, since 
if the threshold value is higher, then fewer 
individuals become entrepreneurs and, as a 
consequence, fewer vacancies are opened (see 
again Appendix F). As illustrated graphically 
(see Figure 3), the function  S  assumes a 
small but positive value ( minS ) for 0 , 
and tends to infinity for sufficiently large values 
of   where   0V . Vice versa, the Job 
Creation Condition tends to zero for maxS  
(the whole population chooses to become 
workers), whereas for minS  it tends to its 
maximum value   .29 
 
                                                 
28 Intuitively, this is straightforward to understand since 
the greater θ, the smaller the probability of a firm filling a 
vacancy, and the greater θ, the higher the probability of 
the worker finding a job. 
29 Fonseca et al. (2001) exclude the value θ = ∞ since in 
this case a vacancy is never filled. 
 
Figure 3. Equilibrium reservation (entrepreneurial) 
ability and market tightness. 
 
The   shown in Figure 3 is the value of   that 
satisfies the condition   0V , i.e. the 
equilibrium value of   obtained from the 
standard matching model in the absence of 
entrepreneur-worker choice. Essentially, values 
of   higher than  are excluded since if    
then   0V  (see Appendix F). 
As in the Uren (2007) model, the number of 
entrepreneurs in the total population is fixed; 
therefore the key role of the zero-profits 
condition in creating vacancies is lost. More 
precisely, in the Fonseca et al. (2001) model, 
the cut-off condition (from which the threshold 
value of entrepreneurial ability S  is derived) 
determines – along with the Job Creation 
Condition – the total number of firms (filled 
jobs and vacancies) and of workers (employed 
and unemployed). 
Finally, Pissarides (2002) basically enhances 
the former model. Indeed, the choice is now 
more detailed since the potential new 
entrepreneur also decides the number of job 
vacancies to be created and managed ( ), based 
on the following maximisation condition: 
      

rUgrV max   [26] 
where  g , with   0' g , is the cost of 
managing a job which depends on the 
entrepreneurial ability  . It follows that, 
  rVg   '     [27] 
i.e. the marginal cost of managing a job is equal 
to the marginal revenue from the posting of one 
more job vacancy. The maximisation condition 
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is also used to obtain the threshold value that 
determines the entrepreneur-worker decision:  
   
 

g
rUrV
S

    [28] 
However, unlike the previous model, 
individuals now become entrepreneurs when 
S , since the increase in entrepreneurial 
ability decreases the management costs. 
Basically, the most able entrepreneurs have a 
lower  , and therefore a lower management 
cost  g .30 
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Mathematical Appendixes 
 
Appendix A 
Wages are determined starting from the first 
order condition for the optimal subdivision of 
surplus, namely 
    UWVJw  1maxarg
   VJUW 




1
. By using the 
Bellman equations, it immediately follows that: 
V
r
Vwy
U
r
Uw















1
 
 rVwyrUw 




1
   rVyrUw  1
 since the free-entry condition 
(
 cJV 0 ) is valid, it is possible to 
deduce 
  


  

  cbrUUWbrU
1
1
, 
from which the final expression is easily 
obtained: 
    cybw 1  [A.1] 
The surplus of a job, S , is defined as the sum of 
the worker’s and firm’s value of being on the 
job, net of the respective external options, so 
that: UVWJS  . Applying basic 
algebra and using the Bellman equations the 
following is obtained:   
       VJcUWbWUJVyrS     1
 
finally, knowing that    SUW    and 
    SVJ  1 , we obtain:31 
     


11r
cby
S  [A.2] 
 
Appendix B 
In order to obtain the “new” Job Creation 
Condition (JCC), the equation for determining 
wages is substituted into the expression for 
 xJr  : 
                                                 
31 These rates can be obtained very simply from the first 
order condition for determining wages. 
         sdGsJxJcxybxyxJr
Rwage










1
 1    
 
           sdGsJcbxyxJr
R

1
 1 
     [B.1] 
The value of the equation [B.1] is found for 
Rx  , with   0RJ : 
       sdGsJcbRy
R

1
 10 
     [B.2] 
The value of the equation [B.2] is subtracted 
from the equation [B.1], obtaining: 
       RyxyxJr   1
 
   
 



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r
Ryxy
xJ
1
 [B.3] 
Considering equation [B.3] for 1x , (since the 
firm creates new jobs with maximum 
productivity), and using the expression for  1J  
obtained through the zero-profit condition, i.e. 
    





 
c
JVJcVr 11 , the 
“new” Job Creation Condition (JCC) is 
obtained: 
 
 
 R
r
y
c 


 1
1
    


 JCC  [B.4] 
from which it immediately follows that 0
dR
d
. 
The Job Destruction Curve is determined in the 
following way. Starting with equation [B.1]: 
           sdGsJcbxyxJr
R

1
 1   
 sJ  is substituted with [B.3], where, 
obviously, sx   
       
 
 
   sdGRs
r
y
cbxyxJr
R
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1
 
1
1



     [B.5] 
[B.5] is evaluated for Rx  , which is the 
threshold productivity value of a job, below 
which the job itself is destroyed:  
   
 
 
   sdGRs
r
y
cbRy
R
 
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1
110
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     [B.6] 
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Finally, in order to obtain a clearer expression, 
all the members of [B.6] are divided by 
  y 1 , obtaining: 
   
   sdGRs
ry
c
y
b
R
R
 

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1
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

JD
                 [B.7] 
Completely differentiating this equation, we 
obtain: 
   
  

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
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y
c
11
1 




, 
with 0
dR
d
, since the last term between 
brackets is a product of two numbers, both 
smaller than one. 
 
Appendix C 
The free-entry condition for equilibrium is valid 
even out of the stationary state, i.e. 
   
   

t
c
tJtV 0 t   . The dynamic of 
 tJ  out of the steady state is given by: 
        tJtJ0wytJr  
       wytcrtJ    [C.1] 
Differentiating      tctJ   with respect to 
time we obtain: 
     ttctJ     1    [C.2] 
Substituting [C.2] into [C.1], we obtain the 
differential equation for  : 
         wytcrttc     1
                                                   
 
 
   
 
   
















11
t
c
w
t
c
y
t
r
t
     [C.3] 
From which we get: 
 
 
  0


t
t
t





 
           








 









 t
c
w
t
c
w
t
c
yr
1
/
1
1
 
Dividing both sides by 
 
c
t

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
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, since we know that 0/  w , 
      wytcrt   0 , and 
  11  . Firms’ decisions on vacancies to 
open makes dynamics of   outside the steady 
state “unstable”. 
 
Appendix D 
The representative firm i solves the following 
optimisation problem:
32
 
 


0
 dtevcnwny triii
vi
max  
subject to the constraint given by employment’s 
evolution over time: 
iii nvn 
    
The representative firm, that can open more 
than one vacancy at a time, takes the value of 
labour market tension as given, ignoring the 
effects that their own decisions will have on the 
aggregate conditions of labour market tension. 
Setting up the Hamiltonian we have that: 
       triiiii envtvcnwnytH    
where iv  is the control variable, in  is the state 
variable and  t  is the so called “shadow 
value” that specifically expresses the marginal 
value of a filled job for the firm. The 
optimisation solutions to the problem are the 
following:
33
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32 For simplicity, as is common in matching models, it is 
assumed that the marginal productivity of labour is a 
linear function of employment. 
33 The optimisation solutions also include the necessary 
trasversality condition:   0 

i
tr
t
netlim . 
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dove 
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       ttrwy    [D.2] 
[D.1] is a standard optimality condition: in 
equilibrium, the marginal value of a filled job 
must be equal to the expected cost of a vacancy. 
[D.2] on the other hand expresses the evolution 
in time of the marginal value of a filled 
vacancy. In the steady state, with   0 t , 
combining the two solutions, the standard 
equilibrium condition is obtained for the job 
demand side, i.e. the Job Creation Condition: 
 


 c
r
wy
    [D.3] 
which is exactly the same as the JCC obtained 
in the standard basic model. 
As regards the socially efficient solution, the 
maximisation problem is the following: 
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In this case, the value of labour market tension 
is endogenous. Moreover, the socially efficient 
solution ignores the wage and considers the 
utility flows obtained from unemployed 
workers, i.e.  nb  1 , where the labour force 
is, for simplicity, normalised to 1; hence,  n1  
is the unemployment rate. As before, the 
optimisation solutions are obtained by 
formulating the Hamiltonian: 
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1
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    
dt
etd
n
tH tr
i




 
            trenvvttby 11 1   
     tretrt  
       ttrby    1 [D.5] 
Combining [D.4] with [D.5] at the steady state 
  0 t , the marginal value of a filled job is 
obtained, i.e. the Job Creation Condition: 
       



11
c
r
by
 [D.6] 
 
Appendix E 
With the possibility that an entrepreneur can 
deduct the cost of opening a vacancy from the 
free-time value z, the surplus is now given by 
     


11
2
r
czy
S . Hence, by 
using the Bellman equations, it is possible to 
solve the equality condition     rUrV  : 
     UWzVJcz     1  
  SSc     11  
           rczyczy 21220 1
                 [E.1] 
which is defined in the following way, 
             rczyczyC 21221
                                             [E.2] 
given the so called Inada 
conditions: 0limlim
1
0 







  , 
 





  0
1 limlim , under the 
condition 02  zy , we obtain: 
            021221' 1   zyczyC  
;     C0lim ;     Clim ; as a 
consequence, the intermediate value theorem 
implies the existence of a solution and the 
monotonic nature of  C guarantees 
uniqueness. Once the uniqueness of the 
equilibrium value of the vacancy-
unemployment relationship is guaranteed, it is 
possible to describe the allocation of the 
individuals between entrepreneurship and 
labour force (i.e. to know the equilibrium values 
of l ). In steady state we have: 
 





l
v
1
, 





1
l
u . For the steady level of vacancies 
and unemployment to be consistent with the 
equilibrium value of labour market tensions, the 
 
 lu
lv
  relationship must be respected. Solving 
the former expression for l , it is possible to 
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obtain the equilibrium value of workers ( l ) and, 
as a consequence, of entrepreneurs ( l1 ): 
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Appendix F 
From the Bellman equations, 
 VJcVr  
 JVwyJr    
 WUwWr    
 UWzUr   1  
very simple algebra gives: 
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r
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Hence, it is straightforward to get: 
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with     0




rcwy
rV
 and 
    0




rzw
rU
, since it must be true 
that zw  . Furthermore, wyrVlim rr 0 , 
by the l’Hôpital rule; zrUlim
i
0 ; 
crVlim
i
 ; wrUlim i  , by the 
l’Hôpital rule. 
The evolution of employment can be expressed 
in terms of both firm’s transition rates (   ) 
and worker’s transition rates (  1 ), i.e.: 
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Hence, in steady-state ( 0rn ), we get: 
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It follows that for any level of employment n, 
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Straightforward algebra gives: 
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By the properties of the matching function, the 
right-hand side is increasing in  ; whereas, the 
left-hand side is decreasing in S . Therefore, 
total differentiation gives 0
dS
d
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